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The Constitutional Federal Question in
the Lower Federal Courts of the United
States and Canada
By John T. Cross*
L INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the province of British Columbia proposed that the Fed-
eral Court of Canada be merged into the provincial courts. Although
couched in terms of a merger, the proposal was undeniably an attempt
to dismantle the Federal Court as a separate political entity.' Given
Canada's ongoing constitutional difficulties, the proposal has not re-
ceived serious consideration to date and is unlikely to rise to the fore
anytime soon. It nevertheless remains on the table. As Canada strug-
gles to redefine the respective spheres of federal and provincial sover-
eignty, it is conceivable that abolition of the Federal Court could
become one of the stakes in the negotiation. Indeed, British Colum-
bia is not alone in its suggestion. Other, less partisan, sources have
questioned whether Canada really needs the Federal Court3
Any proposal to abolish the Federal Court of Canada may seem
quite curious to observers in the United States. The federal district
courts and courts of appeal are certainly a well-established part of
United States federalism, having been in existence for almost the en-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law. B.S. Bradley
University, 19S1; J.D. University of Illinois, 1984.
This Article is attributable to the generosity of the Canadian Government, hich pro-
vided funding for research in Toronto, and to Dean James MacPherson of the Faculty of
Law at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, who was kind enough to afford me
free run of his fine institution during my visit.
1. For an excellent review of the proposal, see SPECIAL CO'.zurrur. ON THE FED.
ERAL COURT, CANADIAN BAR AssOCaATION, REPORT TO COUNCIL ON THE BRmTSH CO.
LUMBIA PROPOSAL FOR MERGER OF THE FEDERAL COURT INTO PROVINCIAL SUPRIuoR
COURTS (1990).
2. Peter Hogg, Federalism and the Jurisdiction of the Canadian Courts, 30 U.N.B.L.J.
9,10 (1981); John M. Evans & Brian Slattery, Comment on Roberts v. Canada, 63 CAN. B.
RE%. 817 (1989); John B. Laskin & Robert J. Sharpe, Constricting Federal Court Jurisdic-
tion: A Comment on Fuller Construction, 30 U. TORONro LU. 283 (19S0).
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tire history of the United States.3 However, few would argue that
lower federal courts are a sine qua non of a federal system. As the
Australian experience demonstrates, operating a federal system with-
out lower federal courts is certainly possible.4 Unlike a supreme
court, which is probably necessary to act as the ultimate arbiter of
important national issues, lower federal courts are in a sense redun-
dant. In any true federal government,5 the regional6 governments op-
erate their own court systems. These regional courts are perfectly
capable of hearing all cases that may arise, regardless of whether they
involve regional, national, or international law. Therefore, operating
a system of lower federal courts to hear these same sorts of cases is in
theory merely duplicative.
Nevertheless, a separate federal court system has proven to be
quite important at certain critical junctures in United States history.
Federal courts in the United States have above all served as guardians
of the Constitution and federal law. United States federalism would
be radically different today had lower federal courts not existed to
implement Congress' various national programs. Controversial fed-
eral efforts such as school desegregation probably would not have suc-
ceeded had litigation been confined to the state courts. One widely
held view is that state courts are either insensitive to--or indeed bi-
ased against-the aims of both the federal government and the nation
as a whole. If this is true, a system of lower federal courts, although
technically redundant, is necessary to preserve the supremacy of the
federal government and its laws.7
3. As one of its first major acts, the first Congress established a system of lower fed-
eral courts. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982)).
4. Although section 71 of the Australian Constitution authorizes the Australian fed-
eral Parliament to establish lower federal courts, the various courts that Parliament has
established under this provision have been granted a relatively narrow jurisdiction. Since
the system was revamped in 1976 with the passage of the Federal Court of Australia Act,
Australia operates only two lower federal courts: (a) the Family Court, with jurisdiction
over matters related to marriage, divorce, and annulment, and (b) the Federal Court, with
original jurisdiction over certain commercial matters, and appellate jurisdiction from the
state courts over certain other federal matters. See 2 KENNETH R. REDDEN, MODERN
LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDiA 2.20.29-31 (1989); Hogg, supra note 2, at 19-20.
5. A "true" federal government is one that divides sovereignty between a national
(federal) authority and several regional authorities in such a way that both the national and
regional authorities may exercise direct control over individual action. PETER HOoo, CON-
sTrrtUoNAL LAw OF CNADA 80 (2d ed. 1985).
6. Because Canada and the United States refer to their regions by different names,
this Article will use the generic term "region" when the discussion applies to both the
provinces of Canada and the states of the United States. The term "region" does not
include, however, federal territories or other enclaves governed by the federal authority.
7. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
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Like the United States, Canada is a true federal system with sig-
nificant powers vested in both the federal and provincial governments.
How, then, can Canada consider abolishing the Federal Court? One
must, of course, take into account the nature of Canadian federalism,
which is different from the United States version in a number of im-
portant respects.8 Yet, there are many fundamental similarities be-
tween the systems. Canada has enacted a large body of federal law
that governs a wide array of everyday activities.9 In addition, the Ca-
nadian Constitution guarantees certain basic rights and liberties.10
Because of the importance of the Constitution and federal law in Can-
ada, it would seem to an American observer that a system of national
courts would be necessary to administer that law.
This Article will compare the Canadian and American experience
with using lower federal courts to interpret and enforce the constitu-
tions and federal laws of the two nations. The Article first analyzes
the scope of the constitutional provisions that govern federal court
jurisdiction. Although the language of the two constitutions is very
different, they have been interpreted in roughly the same manner.
The primary role of federal courts in both countries is to administer
federal law. Next, the Article explores certain problem areas that
arise in applying this "federal question" jurisdiction, for example,
cases involving claims governed by both federal and regional law. The
State Prisoners, 76 HAzv. L RE%,. 441 (1963); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARV. L. RE%. 1105 (1977).
In more recent years, however, many have begun to question this claim, especially
given that conservative Republicans held the presidency (and therefore the power to nomi-
nate federal judges) from 1981 to 1993. Today, state courts often prove more receptive to
claims that certain activities are constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (holding that the right to privacy in the Kentucky Con-
stitution extends to certain acts of sodomy, even though the United States Supreme Court
had refused to protect such acts under the national Constitution); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L Rnv. 593 (1991); Michael E. Solimine & James L.
Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of
Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CoNSr. L.Q. 213 (1983).
8. For example, the federal Parliament has the exclusive power to enact criminal
laws. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867), § 91(27). Although the United States Con-
gress may also enact criminal laws, these federal criminal statutes are specialized provi-
sions that operate alongside the vast body of state criminal law.
9. For example, the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C., ch. F-27 (19S5)(Can.), establishes
strict nationwide controls on the advertisement, labelling, and sale of foodstuffs and
pharmaceuticals.
10. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), §§ 1-34. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter), contained in
sections 1-34 of the Constitution Act, 1982, establishes a number of fundamental rights for
Canadians.
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Canadian and United States courts have tended to diverge in these
problem areas. Overall, the Canadian Supreme Court has taken a
much narrower view of the constitutional authority of lower federal
courts than has its American counterpart.
Drawing implications from this difference in jurisdiction is more
troubling. The Canadian Federal Court certainly plays a more limited
role in administering federal law than do the United States federal
courts. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Canadian
system fails to protect the federal interest in its federal laws. Signifi-
cant differences exist between the Canadian and United States judicial
systems that guarantee that the federal interests in any particular mat-
ter will be considered. The last part of the Article analyzes these
structural differences and concludes that, taken as a whole, both judi-
cial systems provide enough safeguards against local influence to en-
sure adequate consideration of the federal interest.
It should be emphasized at the outset that this Article is largely
about potential The main focus is the scope of the constitutional pro-
visions authorizing federal court jurisdiction. The extent to which the
federal courts may actually exercise this jurisdiction is subject to the
whims of Parliament and Congress. Indeed, the current jurisdictional
statutes of the two nations differ considerably in scope." Because the
constitution ultimately defines the boundaries between federal and
state sovereignty, discussion will be limited to the constitutional grant.
H. THE SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERAL
QUESTION
A. The Constitutional Grant of Jurisdiction
From both a political and a historical perspective, the constitu-
tions of the United States and Canada are very different creatures.
11. Most notably, while Congress has given the federal courts "general" federal ques-
tion jurisdiction over all cases that arise under federal law and are not specifically assigned
to some other court, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988), Parliament has confined the jurisdiction of
the Federal Court to certain categories of cases. For federal claims that fall outside these
categories, the Federal Court has jurisdiction only if no other constitutional court (a term
that includes the provincial superior courts) may hear the case. Federal Court Act, R.S.C.,
ch. F-7, § 25 (1985) (Can.).
The existence of federal legislative control over federal jurisdiction is the main reason
why Australia has been omitted from the discussion. Although section 71 of the Australian
Constitution authorizes a system of lower federal courts at least on a par with the Cana-
dian system, the Australian federal Parliament has never operated a lower federal court
with broad jurisdiction. See supra note 4. Therefore, the Australian courts have not yet
been forced to consider the outer limits of federal judicial power.
[Vol. 17:143
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The United States Constitution was the product of a revolution. The
framers were forced to create a new government from the ground up
to replace the one they had ousted." They remembered quite well
the abuses of power that occurred under British Imperial rule and cre-
ated safeguards to prevent the new government from repeating those
mistakes.'3 In short, the United States Constitution is a self-contained
instrument which creates and carefully regulates an entirely new sys-
tem of government.
The Canadian experience has been quite different. First, it is dif-
ficult to pinpoint exactly what constitutes the Canadian "Constitu-
tion." The powers of the Canadian government have been established
and modified by a series of acts and charters over the last 125 years.
The main instruments, however, are the British North America Act of
1867 (BNA)I4 and the Constitution Act, 1982,15 which together consti-
tute the bulk of the Canadian Constitution.
16
For the purposes of this Article, the BNA is the more important
of the two. Like the United States Constitution, the BNA contains
the basic allocation of power between the federal and provincial gov-
ernments, including the respective judiciaries. Yet the BNA is quite
different in kind from the United States Constitution. Although in a
sense also the product of revolution,17 the BNA does not represent a
12. The current United States Constitution was actually the second try at establishing
a system of government for the newly independent colonies. The first w'as the short-lived
Articles of Confederation, which was in effect from the end of the Revolution to 1733.
Although the Articles proved to be unworkable for a variety of reasons, the main flaw was
the extremely limited powers granted to the central government. The current Constitution
was designed to allocate more powers to the central government ,while retaining certain
critical controls in the states.
13. BRucE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEoPE FouNDAxroNs 1, 67-6S (1991).
14. CAN. CoNsT. (British North America Act of 1867). Although the Constitution
Act, 1982 changed the name of the BNA Act to the Constitution Act, 1867, this Article will
employ the old terminology, as it more readily allows the reader to distinguish between the
two Constitution Acts.
15. CAN. CoNsr. (Constitution Act, 1982). The Constitution Act, 19,2 is set forth in
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, U.K. Stats., 1982, ch. 11. The 19S2 Constitution did
not replace the BNA (although it does amend certain provisions), but simply added to it.
As noted supra in note 10, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is one of the most
significant parts of the Constitution Act, 1982. The flood of litigation generated by the
Charter has had a dramatic impact on Canadian jurisprudence.
16. Technically, the Canadian Constitution comprises the Constitution Acts, 1867 and
1982, together with certain other listed acts and orders. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act,
1982), § 52(2).
17. Hard-handed British rule led to two rebellions in 1837, one in Lower Canada (now
Quebec) and the other in Upper Canada (now Ontario). Although these rebellions were
ultimately unsuccessful, they did result in legislative union of Canada and a limited form of
representative government. These interim changes created the impetus for the formal con-
1993]
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break from another sovereign. Indeed, the BNA is a statute of the
British Parliament, not the Canadian. It assumes the continued influ-
ence of Great Britain in Canadian affairs. 18 The BNA is best per-
ceived as a reallocation of powers within an existing framework rather
than the establishment of a new government.
Nevertheless, there are certain basic similarities between the two
constitutional superstructures, especially insofar as the topic of this
Article is concerned. Both constitutions make provision for a
supreme court to serve as the ultimate arbiter of disputes. 19 In addi-
tion, both allow the national legislature to create a system of lower
federal courts.20 These federal courts do not replace the courts of the
regional governments, but serve alongside those courts. Moreover,
the lower federal courts in both systems are courts of limited jurisdic-
tion, with those limits set ultimately by their respective constitutions.
Although the basic structure is the same, the language concerning
the federal judiciaries in the BNA and the United States Constitution
differs significantly. Article III of the United States Constitution vests
the federal "judicial power" in the federal courts.21 That judicial
power is confined to nine categories of cases, three of which turn on
the subject matter of the dispute, and six of which depend on the citi-
zenship or status of the parties.22 For purposes of this Article, the
most important category is the first: "[A]II Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.... "23
This language defines the "federal question" jurisdiction of the United
States federal courts. However, Article III also gives Congress the
federation of Canada in 1867. See Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of Sovereignty: Judicial
Review, Legislative Supremacy, and Federalism in the Constitutional Traditions of Canada
and the United States, 1990 Duxn Li. 1229, 1256-59.
18. The Constitution Act, 1982 was similarly a British statute. However, in sections
38.43 of that Act, the British Parliament ceded to Canada the power to enact future
amendments to its Constitution, thereby removing a potentially significant source of Brit-
ish influence.
19. The United States Constitution creates the Supreme Court, reserving to Congress
a limited power to regulate the Court. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1. The Canadian Constitu-
tion, by comparison, leaves it to Parliament both to establish the supreme court and to
define its jurisdiction. CAN. CON T. (BNA), § 101.
20. Id.
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ability to parcel out that jurisdiction to the federal courts as it sees
fit.24
The BNA is by comparison a model of simplicity. Section 101
allows Parliament to establish a general court of appeal and "any ad-
ditional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Can-
ada."25 Although it defines the purpose of the federal judiciary, the
BNA does not carefully delineate the types of cases those courts may
hear. Like the American Constitution, the BNA leaves it to Parlia-
ment to establish that jurisdiction.
Despite the differences in language, the Canadian and American
courts have interpreted the general scope of these provisions in a re-
markably similar fashion. First, Article III and section 101 are almost
universally viewed as establishing the outer limits of federal jurisdic-
tion. This interpretation flows naturally from section 101, which gives
Parliament the power to create lower federal courts only for a speci-
fied purpose 2 6 On the other hand, Article III, section 2 could con-
ceivably be read as a maximum, a minimum, or a precise definition of
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.- 7 Since Marbur v.
Madison'8 in 1803, however, the Supreme Court has consistently
treated it as a maximum2 9
24. The Constitution is admittedly not specific in this regard. Although Article III,
section 2 allows Congress to make "exceptions" and "regulations" to the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction (which Article I itself defines), nothing in Article III or the remainder of the
Constitution explicitly gives Congress authority to control the jurisdiction of the lower fed-
eral courts. However, the courts have routinely held that the Congress' Article 1, section 8
and Article II, section 2 powers to create a lower federal court include the power to spec-
ify the types of cases which that tribunal may hear. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441
(1850).
25. CAN. CoNsT. (BNA), § 101.
26. The Supreme Court of Canada has struck down several provisions of the Federal
Court Act because they purported to allocate jurisdiction beyond the limits of section 101.
See McNamara Constr. (W.) Ltd. v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654 (section 17(41(a)) and
Quebec N. Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., [197712 S.C.R. 1054 (section 23). Both
cases are discussed in greater detail infra at text accompanying notes 65-73.
27. The plaintiff in Sheldon v. Sill argued that Congress could not deprive the federal
courts of jurisdiction over any category of case that fell within Article III. PtrN W. Low
& JOHN C. JEFFRiEs, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw OF FEDERAL-STATE RrLY.
rONs 184 (2nd ed. 1989). Prior to Sheldon, Justice Story advanced a similar, although
more limited, theory in dictum in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 32.-31
(1816).
28. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
29. In Marbury, the Court invalidated a jurisdictional statute because it went beyond
the nine categories of Article I. It is interesting to note that the Court has never struck
down a jurisdictional statute on that basis since Marbury. The closest the Court has come
to invalidating a statute was its decision in National Mutual Insurance Company v. Tidewa-
ter Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949), where although six Justices agreed upon the principle
1993]
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More importantly, the parallel phrases "Laws of Canada" and
"Laws of the United States" have been construed to include only fed-
eral law.3 0 Thus, although the province of Manitoba is certainly a part
of Canada, Manitoba law is not part of the law of Canada for purposes
of section 101. This limitation directly affects the ability of the federal
court to hear claims that derive from sources other than a federal
statute.3'
That interpretation also serves to define the basic role of the
lower federal courts. Because the Federal Court of Canada has no
jurisdiction other than federal question jurisdiction, it is mainly lim-
ited to construing federal law. The role of the federal courts in the
United States is also primarily limited to interpreting federal law. Ad-
mittedly, federal courts in the United States, unlike their Canadian
counterparts, may hear state-law cases under their "diversity" jurisdic-
tion.32 However, the Rules of Decision Act 33 and the Erie rule34 re-
that a jurisdictional statute that exceeded Article I would be invalid, two of the six inter-
preted the statute in a fashion that fit it within Article III diversity jurisdiction. In all other
cases facing the question, the Court has either sidestepped the issue or fit the statute within
one of the nine categories of Article Im. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nige-
ria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (breach of contract suit against foreign sovereign qualifies as a
federal question because it would involve sovereign immunity, a defense governed by fed-
eral law); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967) (jurisdictional
statute requiring only "minimal" diversity among litigants in interpleader action comports
with requirements of Article III diversity jurisdiction); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (breach of contract claims relating to organized labor governed
by federal law).
In other contexts, the Court has allowed Congress to assign jurisdiction over cases
falling outside Article III. When Congress creates courts for federal enclaves, it may grant
them jurisdiction over all disputes, not merely those listed in Article III. See generally John
Cross, Congressional Power to Extend Federal Jurisdiction to Disputes Outside Article 111: A
Critical Analysis from the Perspective of Bankruptcy, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1189 (1993).
These courts, however, are not true constitutional courts, but "legislative" courts that Con-
gress may make pursuant to its Article I powers.
In addition, it has on occasion been argued that Congress may in exceptional circum-
stances allocate jurisdiction over non-Article III matters even to Article III courts. For a
critical discussion of these theories, see Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Juris-
diction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 542 (1983).
30. Consolidated Distilleries Ltd. v. Consolidated Exporters Corp., [1930] S.C.R. 531,
534; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819-20 (1824).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 35-45.
32. The Constitution authorizes federal jurisdiction in controversies "between Citizens
of different states" and "between a State and Citizens of another State." U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2. Congress has assigned most of this jurisdiction to the lower courts in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1988).
Federal courts may also hear state law claims that are brought in connection with a
closely-related federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988). The constitutional validity of this
"supplemental" jurisdiction is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 96-100,
[Vol. 17:143
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quire the federal courts to follow decisions of the state courts on state
law. Because of these limitations, only in federal question cases do
United States federal courts have any real say in the development of
the law.
In a broad sense, then, lower federal courts in Canada and the
United States serve the same basic function. The primary role of fed-
eral courts in each system is to interpret and apply federal law. That
basic principle can at times prove to be somewhat ambiguous. When
exactly does a case involve "federal" law? Does the power to inter-
pret federal law give the court the authority either to interpret state
law or to wrap up related state law claims? The next section of this
Article will discuss how the courts have resolved these types of
ambiguities.
B. Construing the Scope of the Constitutional Grant
The basic principle underlying federal question jurisdiction in
both Canada and the United States is easy to state, but difficult to
apply. First, the courts must discern exactly what bodies of law are
"federal." Second, even when a given law is clearly "federal," there
are a number of different ways in which that federal law may be rele-
vant to a case. Not all of these necessarily qualify the case as a consti-
tutional federal question. Issues of this sort have arisen with
increasing frequency in both the Canadian and United States federal
courts.
1. What is "Federal" Law?
A statute enacted by the national legislature clearly constitutes
federal law. Were the courts to limit constitutional federal question
jurisdiction to claims for relief explicitly provided by federal statute,
the analysis of this first issue would be relatively simple. However,
neither the Canadian nor the United States courts have confined fed-
eral question jurisdiction to claims under federal statutes. The guiding
principle in both countries instead appears to be considerably
broader. As a general rule, both Canadian and American courts rec-
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
34. The "Erie doctrine" is named after the seminal case of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court has refined that doctrine in a long string of cases. Among
the more important cases are: Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp,, 4S7 US 22
(1988); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945). For an excellent summary of the many facets of the doctrine, see ERLWN CHETEr.
ilsKY, FEDERAL JuRIsDICnoN 260-75 (1989).
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ognize the existence of constitutional federal question jurisdiction in
cases in which federal law forms a necessary element. Both systems
have struggled with many of the same issues in their attempt to define
when this necessary federal element is present. The differences that
have emerged generally reflect disagreements as to what bodies of law
are federal and how dominant the federal element must be to fit the
case within the constitutional grant.
(a) Claims under the Constitution
A constitution is clearly national law. Technically, however, it is
not "federal" law. In the United States, the main body of the Consti-
tution-Articles I to VII-predates the creation of the federal govern-
ment. Further, although all of the amendments were approved by
Congress, they were not effective until approved also by a certain per-
centage of the states. Therefore, as neither the original articles nor
the amendments emanate solely from the federal government, the
United States Constitution is not federal law.
Nevertheless, most of the cases involving significant constitu-
tional issues are litigated in the federal courts. This is due in part to
Article III itself, which explicitly extends the federal judicial power to
cases arising under the Constitution.3 5 Therefore, the federal courts
may exercise jurisdiction over claims brought directly under the
Constitution. 6
These constitutional causes of action, however, represent only a
small fraction of the cases in which federal courts construe the Consti-
tution. Although the Supreme Court has recognized causes of action
for violation of certain constitutional rights, it has refused to recognize
such actions for other provisions.3 7 Most of the federal cases involv-
35. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. This section also extends federal jurisdiction to claims
arising under treaties.
36. Interestingly, with one brief exception from 1801 to 1802, Congress did not assign
the federal courts "general" federal question jurisdiction over federal and constitutional
claims until 1875. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331). That statute has remained in force largely unchanged to this day. The current
version of the Act allows the federal courts to hear all suits "arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States," regardless of the amount in controversy.
37. Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a cause of action for violation of the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (recognizing a cause of
action under the Fifth Amendment); and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (recognizing
a cause of action under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments with Schweiker v. Chilicky,
487 U.S. 412 (1988) (no cause of action under the Fifth Amendment for improper denial of
social security benefits) and Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (no cause of action for
[Vol. 17:143
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ing the Constitution arise not under the Constitution itself, but under
federal statutes. Congress has enacted a broad array of statutes pro-
viding a cause of action for certain violations of constitutional rights.3S
Although these causes of action technically arise under federal law
rather than the Constitution, they do give the federal courts the op-
portunity to interpret and enforce the Constitution on a regular basis.
The situation in Canada is more muddled. Unlike Article III,
BNA section 101 does not explicitly allow federal jurisdiction over
claims arising under the Constitution. And as in the United States,
the Canadian Constitution is not "federal" law. All elements of the
Canadian Constitution up to and including the Constitution Act, 1982
are statutes enacted by the British Parliament. Although the Consti-
tution Act, 1982 relinquished to Canada the power to enact future
amendments, any such amendments must be approved by specified
percentages of provincial legislatures.3 9 Therefore, no part of the Ca-
nadian Constitution originates from the federal government.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that cases arising under
the Canadian Constitution fall outside the constitutional jurisdiction
of the Federal Court. The courts and commentators have suggested
that there are actually two categories of these constitutional cases.
First, a party may seek recovery against someone who violates one of
her constitutional rights. Because the cause of action stems from the
Constitution itself,4 these cases probably lie outside federal
jurisdiction.4
violation of the First Amendment). In the cases rejecting a cause of action, the Court has
noted the existence of alternate forms of relief, either statutory or administrative.
38. The most significant of these in terms of sheer number of cases is undoubtedly 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), which affords a cause of action against state officials uho deprive
constitutional rights while acting "under color of state law."
39. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), §§ 38-47 (governing the process of
amendment).
Certain narrow amendments are exempt from the requirement of provincial approval.
Constitution Act, 1982, § 44 gives Parliament a residual power to amend any constitutional
provisions not explicitly listed in sections 41 and 42 that govern the executive po~'er or the
Senate and House. Although amendments enacted under this provision arguably ,Aould
constitute federal law, it is unlikely that cases involving these provisions would come
before the courts.
40. The vast majority of cases challenging government action in Canada are based
upon rights granted by the Charter. For these cases, section 24 of the Charter explicitly
recognizes a cause of action. Challenges to government action based upon other provi-
sions of the Canadian Constitution can be brought in the form of a declaratory judgment
action. See, eg., Morgan v. Attorney Gen. of P.E.L, [1976] 2 S.C.R 349.
41. Northern Telecom Can. Ltd. v. Communication Workers of Can., [1983] 1 S.C.R.
733, 745; Kigowa v. Canada, 67 D.L.R.4th 304,309 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), [1990] 1 F.C. 804 (C.A.); DAVID SGAYIAS, FEDERAL COURT PRACrCE 1993 9
1993]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
The result may be different when the constitutional claim in-
volves the validity of a federal statute. In Northern Telecom Canada
Ltd. v. Communication Workers, the Supreme Court held that the
Federal Court had jurisdiction to determine whether a federal statute
was constitutional.42 The Federal Court's general section 101 power
to administer the federal statute gave it the authority to consider the
constitutional challenge to that statute. In Northern Telecom, how-
ever, the constitutional claim was brought as a defense in a proceeding
to enforce the federal statute.43 Had the defendant instead brought
an action to declare the federal statute invalid, it is unclear whether
the Federal Court could have heard the case.44 As the complaint in
that case would be based exclusively on rights established by the Con-
stitution, not federal law, the better view is that the case would fall
without section 101 jurisdiction. 5
When compared to the situation prevailing in the United States,
the Canadian Federal Court plays a significantly lesser role in enforc-
ing the Canadian Constitution. Most constitutional cases in Canada
will be decided by the provincial courts. Indeed, case law suggests
that provincial courts are the main caretakers of the constitution.46
(1993) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURT PRAcricE]; Kieran A.G. Bridge, Charter Challenges:
New Twists over Jurisdiction, 12 ADVOCATEs Q. 102, 114-16 (1990). See also Tucker v.
Steetley Indus. Ltd., 9 F.T.R. 307 (T.D. 1987), which reaches the same conclusion, but on
different (and now discredited) grounds.
The statement in the text is qualified only because it has been suggested by at least
one commentator that the Federal Court may have jurisdiction in cases brought under the
Charter (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982). Section 24(1) of the Charter allows anyone
whose Charter rights have been violated to obtain a remedy in a "court of competent
jurisdiction." FEDERAL COURT PRAcncE, supra, at 9, can be read to suggest that the
Federal Court is one of competent jurisdiction for purposes of that provision.
If the authors are suggesting that the Federal Court has general jurisdiction over Char-
ter claims, their suggestion stands in the face of the clear weight of authority. In Mills v.
The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, Justice McIntyre rejected the notion that section 24(1)
could serve as an independent basis for jurisdiction. Rather, the court had to find jurisdic-
tion based upon some other statute. The Federal Court, Appellate Division has relied
upon Mills to hold that nothing in section 24 gives the Federal Court jurisdiction over
claims arising under the Charter. Southam, Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1990] 36 C.P.R.(3d)
350, 1 C.R.R.(2d) 193. See also HoGo, supra note 5, at 696. For recent discussions of the
section 24 concept of a court of competent jurisdiction, see R. v. Seaboyer, [19921 2 S.C.R.
577; Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570.
42. [1983] 1 S.C.R. 733, 735.
43. Id. at 741.
44. In addition, this analysis would not apply in the case where a party raises a consti-
tutional defense to a provincial statute.
45. Accord FEDERAL COURT PAcrncE, supra note 41, at 9.
46. In Canada (A.G.) v. Law Sec. of British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, the
Supreme Court held that Parliament could not deprive the provincial superior courts of
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This differs significantly from the situation in the United States, where
federal courts are, at least today, generally recognized as bearing the
primary responsibility for interpreting and applying the
Constitution. 47
(b) Federal statutes
The most straightforward example of a federal question, of
course, is a claim arising under a federal statute. Federal courts in
both Canada and the United States have undisputed constitutional au-
thority to hear these claims. The real issue in cases involving a federal
statute is determining when a claim actually "arises under" that stat-
ute. Not all federal statutes that prescribe a certain standard of con-
duct provide causes of action for individuals injured by infractions of
that standard. If an injured party nevertheless brings suit based
upon violation of the statute, the court must determine whether a
cause of action can somehow be implied from the language of the leg-
islation. If it can, the case presents a federal question.
The Canadian case of The Queen v. Saskatchewan Wheat Poot 9
provides an excellent working example of this problem. In Saskatche-
wan Wheat Pool, the Canadian Wheat Board contracted to purchase
wheat from a grain elevator. The wheat was infested with insects
when delivered. Delivery of infested wheat clearly violated the Can-
ada Grain Act,50 which establishes strict standards for grades of
wheat. The Wheat Board, therefore, sued the elevator in Federal
Court,5 ' claiming that the elevator had breached the contract by deliv-
jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of federal statutes. See also the opin-
ion of Justice Pigeon in The Queen v. Thomas Fuller Constr. Co. (1958), 106 D.LR.3d 193,
205-06 (S.C.C. 1979).
47. Because it may review decisions of a state's highest court on constitutional mat-
ters, the Supreme Court is correctly perceived as the highest authority on questions of
constitutional interpretation. It is less clear why the lower federal courts are considered
better authority than state courts on the Constitution. Technically, the state courts and the
lower federal courts have equal constitutional stature.
48. Environmental and criminal laws, for example, often provide only for enforcement
by a government agency. Compare the Canadian Environmental Contaminants Act, 1974,
R.S.C., ch. E-12, §§ 20-26 with the United States Resource Conservation and Recover'
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988), both of which provide for enforcement by government
agencies.
49. [1983] 1 S.C.R 205.
50. Canada Grain Act, R.S.C., ch. G-10, § 86(c)(1985).
51. As an arm of the federal government, the Wheat Board was able to invoke section
17 of the Federal Court Act as the basis for federal jurisdiction. Had the Wheat Board not
been an arm of the federal government, it would have had no statutory basis for
jurisdiction.
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ering wheat that fell below the federal standard. However, although
the Grain Act provides criminal sanctions for violation of its provi-
sions, it nowhere specifically states that an aggrieved purchaser may
recover damages. In determining its jurisdiction, then, the Federal
Court had to determine whether the mere fact that the Wheat Board's
claim required interpretation of federal law meant that the lawsuit
arose under federal law.
A case like Saskatchewan Wheat Pool actually presents two re-
lated issues when brought in a federal court. The first is whether the
plaintiff may recover merely by showing a violation of the federal stat-
utory standards. This is an issue of substantive law. Second, if the
court concludes that a cause of action does exist for violating the fed-
eral statute, it must determine whether that claim is a federal claim
within the authority of the Federal Court.
Conceptually, there are two ways for a court to approach the first
issue. It can hold that the statute creates a cause of action by implica-
tion, notwithstanding any lack of explicit language in the statute. On
the other hand, it can turn to the common law of torts and hold that
the statute creates a "duty" that the defendant's actions have violated.
Although both approaches may recognize a cause of action, they raise
very different questions for purposes of federal jurisdiction. Most no-
tably, only the first approach results in a federal statutory claim. Dis-
cussion of the second approach will therefore be reserved until the
section of this Article dealing with the common law.-2
Implying a cause of action from a statute undoubtedly involves a
certain degree of judicial activism. A court must attempt to discern
the legislature's intent when enacting the statute, often without any
trustworthy evidence that the legislature even considered the issue.
Perhaps because of this necessary activism, the Canadian and United
States systems have approached the issue differently. Canadian courts
will not imply a cause of action from a federal statute. Although some
early cases suggested that a cause of action could be implied,5 3 the
Canadian Supreme Court in Saskatchewan Wheat Pool expressly re-
fused to look beyond the language of the Grain Act.54 Later cases
have treated Saskatchewan Wheat Pool as a blanket prohibition
52. See infra text accompanying notes 76-93.
53. See, e.g., Canadian Pac. Air Lines, Ltd. v. The Queen, [1979] 1 F.C. 39 (C.A.). The
Court of Appeal's analysis was remarkably similar to the test for implied causes of action
used in the United States, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 56-57.
54. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 S.C.R. at 226. See also Ingle v. The Queen,
[1984] 2 F.C. 57 (T.D.).
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against implying federal statutory causes of action.-' This certainly
simplifies the Federal Court's analysis of jurisdiction, as it need not
engage in the difficult analysis necessary to determine Parliament's
intent.
Federal courts in the United States, on the other hand, regularly
undertake this analysis. The Supreme Court has established a four-
part test for determining when a private cause of action may be im-
plied from a federal statute. That test considers Congress' subjective
intent together with certain objective factors5 6 Although its more re-
cent decisions still apply the four-part test, any evidence of Congres-
sional intent is virtually controlling? Because United States federal
courts may imply a cause of action from a federal statute, they play a
more proactive role in enforcing federal statutes than the Federal
Court of Canada. United States courts are not limited by the lan-
guage chosen by Congress. Instead, they have limited power to en-
force their perception of the federal mandate through the process of
private civil litigation.
55. Wilder v. Canada, [1988] 2 F.C. 465 (C.A.); Ingle, [1984] 2 F.C. 57.
56. The Supreme Court originally set forth four factors for determining ,hether a
federal statute creates a cause of action:
(1) whether the plaintiff was "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,"
(2) any evidence of legislative intent,
(3) whether it would be "consistent with the underlying purposes of the legisla-
tive scheme" to find a private cause of action, and
(4) whether the subject was one "traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the states."
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,78 (1975).
57. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (19,8) (no cause of action under the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act). As Thompson itself demonstrates, the evidence of
Congressional intent may show that Congress intended that there be no cause of action.
Cases like Thompson suggest that the Court has become increasingly reluctant to im-
ply causes of action. Compare Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S.
527 (1989) (no private right of action by employee against union to enforce statutory duty
of fair representation); Texas Indust., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981)
(no private right of action for contribution under Sherman Antitrust Act); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no private right of action under section 17(a) the
1934 Securities Exchange Act); Ttansamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11 (1979) (no private right of action under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940) with
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (finds private cause of action in
section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act); Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353
(1982) (finds private cause of action under Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act).
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(c) The common law
The legal systems of Canada and the United States are historical
cousins. Although the degree of kinship differs, both are direct de-
scendants of the English system. One of the features that distin-
guishes the English system is the role of judicial precedent in shaping
the law. Most of the rules of tort and contract, and to a lesser extent
property, are "common law" rules crafted by judges in the context of
an actual case.5 8 To this day, courts in the United States and Canada
rely heavily on prior decisions when determining the rule of law to
apply in a given case.
Like all bodies of law, the common law changes constantly.
Although a legal system based upon the common law affords more
deference to stability and tradition than many other systems, Anglo-
American case reporters are filled with cases in which courts have re-
fused to follow precedent, either by creating exceptions to the rule set
forth in an earlier case or by discarding the prior rule altogether. 9
These exceptions and disagreements also form part of the common
law and are afforded deference by later courts. Accordingly, common
law courts continually take part in defining the law.
Whether a federal court can involve itself in this process of refin-
ing the common law depends upon a number of factors. At the most
basic level, it turns upon whether the court has jurisdiction to hear a
case involving a common law claim. Without jurisdiction to hear the
dispute, a federal court is powerless to declare the common law rule
governing that dispute.
United States federal courts have had the authority to hear com-
mon law claims throughout their 200-year history.60 Diversity juris-
diction-which turns on the citizenship or status of the parties rather
than the subject matter of the dispute-allows lower federal courts to
58. The common law as a jurisprudential body is not limited to that set of substantive
rules laid down by the courts of common law. It also includes legal principles established
by the courts of equity and admiralty. Those courts also follow precedent, although not
always to the same degree.
59. Courts in the United States often disagree on the appropriate rules of common
law. See Groucho Marx Prod., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2nd Cir. 1982)
(discussing differences in California and New York law); Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogany
Ass'n, 129 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1942) (rejecting prevailing view concerning availability of an
injunction in a product disparagement suit). Canadian courts afford more deference to
decisions of courts of coordinate jurisdiction. However, a provincial appellate court may
refuse to follow the decision of another appellate court if it demonstrates good reason to
do so. Cf Wolf v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 107.
60. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, §§ 11 (diversity of citizenship), 12 (removal of
cases involving diverse citizens from state courts).
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hear assorted common law cases. However, this diversity jurisdiction
by itself does not give the federal courts any significant influence over
the development of the common law. First, most tort and breach of
contract cases involve litigants from the same state and, therefore, fall
outside diversity jurisdiction. In most cases, then, federal judicial
power will exist only if the common law can be deemed "federal."61
Moreover, a federal court's influence is not that great even when di-
versity is present. A federal court adjudicating a common law claim in
a diversity case has no independent authority to determine the com-
mon law, but must instead attempt to replicate the outcome that the
parties would obtain in the appropriate state court.62
The issue of whether the common law is "federal" is even more
important to the Federal Court of Canada because of its lack of diver-
sity jurisdiction. The ability of the Canadian Federal Court to partici-
pate in refining the common law accordingly turns entirely on whether
the common law is federal law for purposes of the Canadian
Constitution.
The Supreme Courts of both Canada and the United States have
reached surprisingly similar answers to this core question. Both have
concluded that most common law claims do not arise under federal
law.6' On the other hand, each Court has also recognized that certain
types of common law claims do qualify as constitutional federal ques-
tions.64 In order to make sense of this apparent contradiction, a closer
examination of the leading decisions rendered by each Supreme Court
on the general issue of the common law and the federal courts is
necessary.
Why the common law generally is not "federal" law? The
Supreme Courts of both Canada and the United States have followed
very different paths in concluding that a garden variety common-law
claim does not arise under federal law. In fact, the lines of cases in the
two countries appear at first glance to be completely disanalogous,
61. There would be certain cases, however, that would still lie outside the federal juris-
diction. For example, the Eleventh Amendment prevents a federal court from hearing a
suit brought against a state by a citizen of another state, even if that action otherwise falls
into one or more of the Article III categories of jurisdiction. Although Congress may
abrogate a state's immunity by creating new statutory causes of action, Penns)lvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), the amendment would bar federal common.law actions
that fell within its ambit.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 74-75.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 68-73.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 76-85.
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primarily because the issue has presented itself in two entirely differ-
ent contexts.
In Canada, the question of whether the common law is federal
law arises, quite logically, in the context of a challenge to the Federal
Court's jurisdiction. The leading two cases in this area are the
Supreme Court's 1977 decisions in McNamara Construction (W.) Ltd.
v. The Queen65 and Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific
Ltd. 66 The Court in each case faced a constitutional challenge to a
provision of the Federal Courts Act of 1970. The defendant in each
case argued that notwithstanding the provisions of the Federal Court
Act, the Federal Court could not hear the matter because it fell
outside section 101 of the BNA.67
Quebec North Shore involved a claim between private parties for
breach of a contract to build a rail car marine terminal. 68 The contract
stipulated that it was to be governed by the laws of Quebec. 69 The
Supreme Court held that there was no federal jurisdiction over the
breach of contract claim, basing its holding on both the Federal Court
Act70 and section 101. In construing the constitutional provisions, the
Supreme Court held that a case does not fall within section 101 unless
it is based upon "applicable and existing federal law."
'71
Quebec North Shore was an easy case from the standpoint of fed-
eral jurisdiction. Because plaintiff's claim was governed by the law of
Quebec-a separate and distinct body of law in force only in that
province-the Court naturally concluded that the case did not involve
the "laws of Canada" as required by section 101. McNamara presents
a more troubling situation. The breach of contract claim in McNa-
mara was governed by the common law, which is in force in all prov-
65. [19771 2 S.C.R. 654.
66. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054.
67. McNamara, [1977] 2 S.C.R. at 658; Quebec N. Shore, [1977] 2 S.C.R. at 1056.
68. Quebec N. Shore, [1977] 2 S.C.R. at 1055-56.
69. Id. at 1064.
70. Plaintiff based its jurisdictional claim upon section 23 of the Federal Court Act,
alleging that the rail terminal fit within the class of "works and undertakings connecting a
province with any other province or extending beyond the limits of a province." The
Supreme Court noted, however, that the statute also required that the claim arise "under
an Act of Parliament or otherwise." Recognizing that a construction of section 23 that
included non-federal claims could conflict with BNA section 101, the Court interpreted the
phrase "or otherwise" to include non-statutory federal law. Id. at 1063.
71. Id. at 1065-66. Although the Court has expanded the constitutional analysis into a
three-part question, see ITO-Int'l Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Elecs. Ltd., [1986] 1
S.C.R. 752, 766, the fundamental requirement to this day is that the case involve a claim
under federal law.
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inces save Quebec.7 The case, therefore, squarely presented the issue
of whether that body of national law was a law of Canada.
The Court in McNamara applied the "applicable and existing fed-
eral law" test of Quebec North Shore and concluded that the breach of
contract claim did not arise under federal law. McNamara therefore
establishes the general principle that a standard common law contract
claim between private parties does not involve federal law 73 Accord-
ingly, the Federal Court has no jurisdiction over such claims. As a
result of McNamara, the provincial courts (and the Supreme Court of
Canada on appeal) have the primary authority to shape the common
law in Canada.
The United States Supreme Court has resolved the issue of
whether the common law is federal in an entirely different fashion.
The Court's well-known decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins estab-
lishes that the common law is ordinarily state, rather than federal,
law.74 But Erie is fundamentally different from Quebec North Shore
and McNamara. Unlike the Canadian cases, Erie does not approach
the issue as a question of jurisdiction. It instead treats the issue as a
choice-of-law problem. The Supreme Court's opinion mandates that
lower federal courts hearing a common law claim follow state court
precedents in determining the content of the common law rule. s In-
72. McNamara, [1977] 2 S.C.R. at 663.
73. Decisions since McNamara certainly support this conclusion. See Pacific W. Air-
lines Ltd. v. The Queen, [1979] 2 F.C. 476 (T.C.), affirmed [1980] 1 F.C. 86 (CA) (claims
against non-Crown defendants); Gagnon v. Canada, (1988) 40 F.T.R_ 312; Alda Enter. Ltd.
v. The Queen, [1978] 2 F.C. 106; Western Caissons Ltd. v. MeNamara Corp., [1979] 1 F.C.
509; Haida Helicopters Ltd. v. Field Aviation Co., [1979] 1 F.C. 143 (T.D.); The Queen v.
St.-Aubin, [1984] 2 F.C. 309 (T.D.) (third-party claim); Ingle, [1984] 2 F.C. 57 (claims
against non-Crown defendants).
74. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Justice Brandeis, the author of the majority opinion, stated the
matter precisely in his often quoted (and misquoted) phrase, "[t]here is no federal general
common law." Id. at 78.
75. The Erie Court posed the question as whether a federal district court is bound to
apply the common law rules recognized by the courts in the state in which the district court
sits, or whether it may independently determine the appropriate rule. In holding that the
federal courts are obligated to follow the state court decisions, the Supreme Court over-
turned a longstanding federal custom of ignoring state precedent.
The difference in the way in which the issue reached the Canadian and American
Supreme Courts is attributable to the differences in lower federal court jurisdiction. Be-
cause the Federal Court may hear only federal questions, the issue of %hether a common
law claim is federal quite naturally arose as a challenge to the Federal Court's jurisdiction.
The diversity jurisdiction of the United States federal courts, however, allows them to hear
non-federal claims. Because the federal and state court systems are parallel, the courts
often disagreed as to the appropriate rule of law. The Supreme Court decision in Erie was
therefore an attempt to reconcile that dispute by assigning authority over the common law
to one of the two competing systems.
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herent in this general rule is the notion that federal courts have no
innate power to determine the legal rule to apply to garden variety
common law claims. Although they may adjudicate common law
claims, they must act as a state court when selecting the governing rule
of law.
The Canadian and United States approaches are obviously quite
different, yet they have a similar practical effect from the standpoint
of the thesis of this Article. Both Erie and McNamara strip the lower
federal courts of any meaningful role in shaping the general body of
common law. The Canadian cases do so directly, by simply denying
federal jurisdiction over such claims. Erie's approach is more indirect,
for it requires the federal courts to mirror the outcome of state courts.
Nevertheless, both lines of cases give the state and provincial courts
the primary responsibility for developing most of the common law.
Can common-law claims ever be "federal"? Both the United
States and Canada have expressly rejected the argument that the com-
mon law is generally federal law. However, this blanket rule is not
without its exceptions. While Erie and McNamara rejected the notion
that the common law as a whole is federal, other decisions of both
Supreme Courts have recognized specific common-law claims that do
qualify as federal. 76 Identifying the scope of this "federal common
law"-and finding a basis for that doctrine in the American and Cana-
dian Constitutions-has troubled judges and scholars in both
countries. 7
Given the many differences between the court systems, there are
a number of interesting similarities between the concepts of federal
common law in the United States and Canada. First, the doctrines
evolved in roughly the same way. Both Supreme Courts recognized
the existence of a specific "federal" common law at the same moment
as they declared that the general common law was not federal.78 Sec-
76. See cases cited infra in notes 79-85.
77. The Pace Law Review recently dedicated an entire issue to the question of federal
common law. See George D. Brown, Federal Common Law and the Role of the Federal
Courts in Private Law Adjudication-A (New) Erie Problem?, 12 PACE L. REV. 229 (1992);
Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. Rvv. 263 (1992);
Martha A. Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 PACE L. R~v. 303 (1992);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PAE L. REv. 327 (1992). For a recent
Canadian case discussing the problems with federal common law in Canada, see Bradasch
v. Warren, [1990] 3 F.C. 32 (holding that all of the common law in the Yukon territory is
federal).
78. In McNamara itself, the Canadian Supreme Court recognized that the outcome of
the case might have been different if suit had been brought against the Crown; for the case
would have then involved "federal" common law. McNamara, [19771 2 S.C.R. at 662-63.
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ond, the Canadian and American courts have found federal common
law in many of the same categories of cases. At the risk of oversimpli-
fication, federal common law exists in both countries in the following
types of cases: suits involving the liability of the federal government,79
admiralty and maritime suits,80 suits directly affecting interstate/inter-
provincial or international relationssl suits affecting the relationship
See infra note 79 for further discussion of this "Crown" law. Similarly, in a case decided on
the same day as Erie, the United States Supreme Court applied a rule it labelled federal
common law to resolve a dispute over the allocation of water in an interstate stream. Hin-
derlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,110 (1938). The Court's
opinion in this case was authored by Justice Brandeis, who also wrote the majority opinion
in Erie.
79. Canada: Thomas Fuller Const Co., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 695; Alda Enter. Ltd., [1978] 2
F.C. 106; Lubicon Lake Band v. The Queen, 117 D.LR.3d 247 (F.C.T.D. 1940).
United States. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); Feres v. United States, 340 US.
135 (1950); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); see also Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (federal common law applies in a suit
against a government contractor where the outcome of the suit could directly affect the
federal government's ability to purchase military equipment). But see United States v.
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (no federal common law rule %here there is no need
for national uniformity).
The U.S. Supreme Court has also found federal common law in cases brought by the
federal government to enforce a right. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580 (1973); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447
(1942). The Canadian Supreme Court has suggested that Canadian federal common law
applies only in cases in which the Crown is a defendant. McNamara, [1977] 2 S.C.R. at 662.
Yet, in Rhine v. The Queen, 116 D.L.R.3d 385 (S.C.C. 1980), the Court applied federal
common law to claims by the Crown to recover on student loans. It is difficult to reconcile
Rhine with the general rule stated in McNamara. Although the Court noted that the fed-
eral statutes regulating the loans governed every aspect of the lenderiborrower relation-
ship, it also acknowledged that those statutes did not create the right to recover on the
loan. For additional notes on Rhine, see infra note 83. See also St.-Aubin, [1984] 2 F.C. 309
(court assumes, without discussion, that it has jurisdiction over claim brought by the
Crown); Marquis v. The Queen, [1986] 10 F.T.R. 28 (T.D.) (federal common law governs
Crown's claim for set-off under a contract in an action brought under a federal statute).
80. Canada: Monk Corp. v. Island Fertilizers Ltd., [1991] 1 S.C.R. 779; ITO-Int'l Ter-
minal Operators, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752; Shimbato & Co. v. Western Fish Producers, Inc.,
[1990] 1 F.C. 542 (CA.); H. Smith Packing Corp. v. Gainvir Trans., Ltd., 61 D.LR.4th 489
(F.C.C.A. 1989).
United States. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Chelentis v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
(1917).
Interestingly, neither country has seen fit to extend federal common law to disputes
concerning the law of aviation. Haida Helicopters Ltd., [1979] 1 F.C. 143; Pacific IV. Air-
lines Ltd., [1980] 1 F.C. at 89; Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
81. Canada: Avant, Inc. v. The Queen in Right of Ontario, [19S6] 2 F.C. 91 (applying
a federal common-law immunity for provincial crowns, even though Ontario had waived
immunity in its own courts by statute). See also the decision by Pigeon, J. in Inter-
provincial Co-operative v. The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477.
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between the government and recognized aboriginal groups, 2 common
law claims in which a federal statute helps to define the underlying
relationship between the litigants,8" and questions concerning the
practice and procedure in the federal courts.' In addition, the federal
legislature in each country has the authority to federalize a portion of
the common law by passing specific legislation.85
United States: Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Banco Nacional do
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
82. Roberts v. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322; Mcclanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164 (1973).
83. These cases typically involve tort or contract claims based upon the violation of a
standard of conduct created by federal law. In Canada, for example, see Rhine, 116
D.L.R.3d 385 (breach of contract for federally-regulated student loan program); Kigowa,
[1990] 1 F.C. 804 (claim of illegal arrest when Immigration Act sets forth the basic right to
be free); Oag v. Canada, [1987J 2 F.C. 511 (C.A.) (claim of false imprisonment when right
to freedom set forth in the Penitentiary Act). In the United States, for example, see
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (property claim involv-
ing land designated as a federal wilderness area); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91
(nuisance claim relating to waters regulated by Clean Water Act). But see Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (products liability claim for label-
ing drugs in violation of Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is not governed by federal
common law.) They accordingly present many of the same sorts of issues that arise in the
implied cause of action cases discussed supra at text accompanying notes 45-54. However,
the issue in these cases is whether violation of the federal standard may be used to satisfy
one or more of the elements of the tort or contract claim, not whether a cause of action lies
under the statute itself. The two situations are therefore distinct.
The common-law cases can be divided into two categories for purposes of analysis. In
the first, exemplified by Oag, Kigowa, Little Lake Misere, and Merrell Dow, federal law
establishes the underlying duty or obligation that has allegedly been breached. Although
this theory has on rare occasion been extended to its breaking point, see The Queen v.
Montreal Urban Community Transit Comm'n, [1980] 2 F.C. 151 (C.A.) (federal statute
subrogating the Crown to worker's injury transforms suit against tortfeasor into a federal
question); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921) (pre-Erie suit), it is
logical to label the cause of action "federal" where the defendant would owe no duty ab-
sent federal law. Accord FEDERAL COURT PRACrICE, supra note 41, at 10-13,
In the second category, federal law, although not controlling on the act at issue, so
"fills up" the field that all common-law claims in that area are deemed federal. This theory
underlies both Rhine and Illinois v. City of Milwaukee. The second category is considera-
bly more difficult to justify as a pure matter of federal jurisdiction than the first.
84. Friends of the Oldman River Soc'y v. Canada, 68 D.L.R.4th 375,400, [1990] 2 F.C.
18 (C.A.), affd [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3; Chambers v. NASCO, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (1991); Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
85. The Canadian maritime decisions appear to be based upon the theory that Parlia-
ment incorporated the maritime law as federal law in the provisions of the Federal Court
Act. ITO-Int'l Terminal Operators, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 774. The Canadian decision in Rhine
(Parliament may federalize common law contract claims by passing a statute which,
although silent on the particular issue, is intended to "govern every aspect" of the ques-
tion), discussed supra at note 79, is also based in part upon this theory. In the United
States, see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (because the federal environmental
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Third, classifying a claim as federal common law gives the federal
courts the potential authority to hear it. In both Canada and the
United States, a federal common law claim is a constitutional federal
question.86 This classification expands, albeit to a limited extent, the
power of the lower federal courts to define the contours of the com-
mon law. In addition, because most of the categories of federal com-
mon law are cases in which the federal government has a significant
interest, federal common law gives federal courts the ability to protect
that interest.
However, assuming that the existence of federal common law in-
creases the role of the Canadian and United States federal courts to
the same extent would be a mistake. At least two factors may limit
the practical effect of federal common law. First, United States fed-
eral courts have always had the ability to adjudicate common-law
claims under their diversity jurisdictionP Therefore, the addition of a
limited class of federal common-law claims to their jurisdiction does
not represent that great an addition to their role. For Canadian
courts, on the other hand, the recognition of federal common law puts
an entirely new category of cases within their purview.
Second, notwithstanding the facial similarities, there are some
very real differences between the Canadian and American notions of
federal common law. The disagreement turns not merely on the true
nature of the narrow realm of federal common law, but on the nature
of the common law itself. Largely as a result of Erie, both federal and
state courts in the United States have come to view the common law
as "judge-made" law. "Federal" common law is simply a body of
law that federal judges have the power to create. The substantive
rules of federal common law can and often do differ from the com-
mon-law rules created by the state courts.
laws "fill up the area," a common law nuisance claim based upon water pollution is gov-
erned by federal common law).
86. Kigowa, [1990] 1 F.C. 804; Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 99.
87. The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, discussed infra at text accompanying notes
93-97, also allows federal courts to hear common law claims.
88. Erie proceeds from the premise that law is something made by-not merely inter-
preted by-judges. As the Supreme Court itself later described the case, -[Erie] overruled
a particular way of looking at law which dominated the judicial process long after its inade-
quacies had been laid bare. Law was conceived as a 'brooding omnipresence' of Reason,
of which decisions were merely evidence and not themselves the controlling foundation."
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101-02 (1945). Erie's "balkanized" view of the
common law, although technically applicable only to the federal courts, has pervaded the
entire body of United States jurisprudence.
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Canada, however, still follows the original view of the common
law, under which the common law is a universal body of natural law
applicable in all common law nations.89 The role of a judge in this
system is not to make law, but instead to determine the appropriate
natural law rule to apply in a given case. Canadian federal common
law fits into this general jurisprudential framework. Federal common
law in Canada is not a parallel body of federal judge-made law that
competes with the common law applied by provincial courts. °
Rather, federal common law is merely a part of the overall common
law.91 The only distinction between federal and non-federal common
law is that federal common law happens to lie within the jurisdiction
of the Federal Court under Section 101 of the BNA.92
This difference is more than semantic. Because federal common
law in the United States can easily differ from state law, the federal
courts have an independent power to craft the rules of law as they see
fit. In Canada, however, the federal judge in a federal common law
case must act as any other common law judge, looking to the prece-
dent established by both federal and provincial judges on the subject.
The actual substance of federal common law in Canada does not ap-
pear to differ to any appreciable extent from the substance of regular
common law.93 This may restrict the ability of the Federal Court to
89. See, e.g., Canadian Nat. Ry. Co. v. Rainbow Indus. Caterers, Ltd., [1991] 3 S.C.R.
3, in which the Supreme Court of Canada analyzes a general common-law question.
90. Federal common law can, however, conflict with the terms of a state statute. There
is at least some indication that the Canadian courts in these circumstances will afford para-
mountcy to the federal common law. In Bisaillon v. Keable, [198312 S.C.R. 60,108, Justice
Beetz indicated in dictum that a rule of federal common law would take precedence over a
state statute. Professor Peter Hogg challenges this statement, arguing that the doctrine of
"paramountcy" should be confined to legislative acts. HoOG, supra note 5, at 354 n.7.
91. Professor Stephen Scott has argued that certain portions of the common law fall
within section 101. He maintains that those rules of the English common law that were
continued in Canada under BNA section 129 should be considered "laws of Canada." Ste-
phen Scott, Canadian Federal Courts and the Constitutional Limits of Their Jurisdiction, 27
McGmL LJ. 137 (1982). His argument, however, is based upon the legislative competency
theory, an approach rejected by the Supreme Court in McNamara. [197712 S.C.R. at 1064-
65.
92. Comparing the Canadian and American views of federal common law helps to
expose the logical flaws in each. For example, neither approach satisfactorily explains ex-
actly why the common law of contract is magically transformed into "federal" law in a case
involving the contractual obligations of the federal government. A full exposition of the
problems with the notion of federal common law, however, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
93. In none of the main Canadian cases involving federal common law is there any
indication that the governing rule of law is in any way different than the rule that would
apply in an ordinary civil dispute.
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incorporate the federal interest into the special body of federal com-
mon law. Federal common law certainly allows both Canadian and
American courts some influence over the development of the law in
areas touching directly upon important interests of the federal govern-
ment. However, exactly how significant that influence may be in prac-
tice is unclear because of the differences in the nature of federal
common law in each country.
2. Must a Case Deal Exclusively with Federal Law to State a
Federal Question?
The preceding section analyzed whether various types of claims
constitute federal questions for purposes of section 101 of the BNA
and Article III of the United States Constitution. Although that basic
analysis is fundamental to understanding federal question jurisdiction,
it certainly does not exhaust all of the issues that may arise. Many, if
not most, lawsuits involve more than one claim. The liberal joinder
rules in force in both the United States and Canada allow a plaintiff to
join several claims into a single suit. In addition, defendants may add
issues of substantive law to a case by asserting a defense to plaintiffs
allegations or by filing a counterclaim seeking affirmative relief. Fi-
nally, the joinder rules allow additional parties to join or be added to a
lawsuit, further increasing the number of claims that a court may adju-
dicate. Accordingly, a single case may involve a wide variety of issues.
When all of the substantive rights involved in a case are federal,
the federal courts in both Canada and the United States clearly have
constitutional federal question jurisdiction. The more difficult case is
when a lawsuit involves both federal and non-federal substantive
rights. Courts in both countries have struggled with determining
whether these hybrid cases may be litigated as a unitary action in the
federal courts.
The natural starting point, of course, must be the text of the con-
stitutions. However, a literal reading of the relevant constitutional
language proves remarkably deceptive. Article III of the United
States Constitution extends federal jurisdiction to "cases and contro-
versies ... arising under" federal law.94 Taken literally, this language
appears to exclude hybrid cases, for these cases "arise under" both
federal and non-federal law. By contrast, section 101 allows a federal
court to hear any case that involves the "administration" of federal
law. A case involving both federal and state law claims could certainly
94. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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affect the administration of federal law.95 Therefore, a literal reading
of section 101 would extend federal jurisdiction to these hybrid cases.
The actual interpretations of these provisions, however, have
been just the opposite. United States courts have interpreted Article
III quite broadly. Instead of limiting federal jurisdiction to lawsuits
involving solely federal claims, the courts have allowed federal ques-
tion jurisdiction in hybrid cases in which a federal substantive right
forms a core element of the cause of action.96 Provided the federal
core is present, the federal right and all related state law rights form a
single "case." Because this case arises at least in part under federal
law, it qualifies for Article III federal question jurisdiction. 7 This
form of jurisdiction over non-federal claims is commonly referred to
as ancillary jurisdiction.98 Federal courts have relied upon this ancil-
lary jurisdiction as the basis for adjudicating a wide variety of state
law matters.99 Indeed, the doctrine allows federal courts to adjudicate
the state law matters even if they rule against the claimant on the
federal claim.100
The Canadian opinions suggest a narrower view. In the early
years of the Federal Court, several cases used a doctrine akin to ancil-
95. Of course, in order for its decision to affect federal law, the court would have to
pass on the federal law issue. This notion underlies the United States Supreme Court's
"adequate and independent state ground" doctrine, under which it will not review a state
court's ruling on a federal issue if there is an alternate state-law basis supporting the state
court's holding. See, e.g., Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); Murdock v. City
of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
96. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The federal right may
either form part of the underlying claim, or a defense to a state-law claim. Although Lou-
isville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) held that a federal question must
form an essential element of plaintiff's complaint in order to invoke federal jurisdiction,
that holding is generally viewed as limited to the language of the general federal question
jurisdiction statute (28 U.S.C. § 1331) instead of Article III. Thus, in Mesa v. California,
489 U.S. 121 (1989), the Supreme Court upheld a statute that allows an action based upon
state law to be removed to federal court as long as the defendant interposed a federal
defense.
97. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
98. The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, and the closely-related doctrine of "pendent"
jurisdiction, are primarily court-created doctrines that received constitutional imprimatur
in Gibbs. Since Gibbs, Congress has codified these concepts in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 under the
name "supplemental" jurisdiction. Because this Article focuses on the constitutional limits
on federal jurisdiction, it will use the older term "ancillary" jurisdiction to distinguish the
constitutional doctrine set forth in Gibbs from the statutory grant of section 1367. The
statute sets significant limits on federal jurisdiction over certain types of state-law claims.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (precluding supplemental jurisdiction over certain non-fed-
eral claims asserted by plaintiffs).
99. See generally CARL.i.ns Wiurrr, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 31 (4th ed. 1983)
100. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
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lary jurisdiction to exercise jurisdiction over provincial or common
law claims that were "intertwined" with a federal claim.1"1 In 1988,
however, the Federal Court of Appeal expressly rejected this inter-
twining approach in Varnam v. Canada.l"" The Varnam court criti-
cized the intertwining approach as "altogether too vague and elastic a
standard" to determine federal jurisdiction.0 3 One year later, the
Supreme Court in Roberts v. Canada declined to rule on a party's at-
tempted use of the approach, choosing instead to sustain jurisdiction
on another basis.10 Many have concluded, based upon Varnam and
Roberts, that section 101 does not allow Federal Court jurisdiction
over non-federal claims, regardless of how closely they may be related
to the federal claim.' 5 The Federal Court today will hear a given
claim only if it can "stand alone" as a federal question. It accordingly
has no jurisdiction over non-federal claims or defenses.1c"
However, ancillary jurisdiction may not be completely dead in
Canada. First, the Supreme Court has not yet issued a definitive rul-
ing on the issue. More importantly, even the Federal Court of Ap-
peal's discussion in Varnam rejecting the intertwining approach is
confined to the jurisdictional statute at issue, section 17(a) of the Fed-
eral Court Act.' 7 Section 101 uses different wording and, therefore,
need not be interpreted so narrowly.10 In addition, the policy justifi-
101. The most often-cited of these cases is Marshall v. Canada, [19S6] 1 F.C. 437 (T.D.).
However, several other federal cases, both before and after Marshall, followed this ap-
proach. See Bensol Customs Brokers Ltd. v. Air Canada, [1979] 2 F.C. 575 (CA); Black-
foot Indian Band No. 146 (Members) v. Canada (A.G.), [1986] 5 F.T.R. 23 (T.D.); Davie
Shipbuilding Ltd. v. The Queen, [19791 2 F.C. 235 (T.D.).
102. Varnam v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare), [19,S] 2 F.C. 454,50
D.L.R.4th 44 (C.A.).
103. [1988] 2 F.C. at 461.
104. Roberts v. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322, 334. Roberts was a dispute between two
Indian bands concerning which band had a superior right to use a given parcel of land. The
Supreme Court held that federal common law governed the dispute and that the case was
therefore a clear federal question.
105. Fort Alexander Indian Band v. Canada, 121 N.R. 237 (Fed. CA. 1991); FEDERAL
COURT P.Acnc, supra note 41, at 16; Hoao, supra note 5, at 146-47. Professor Hogg has
on another occasion criticized this ruling, arguing that the Canadian courts could make use
of the doctrine. Hogg, supra note 2, at 22-24.
106. A number of federal cases had applied the "stand alone" test prior to airnam.
See, eg., Stephens v. The Queen, [1982] 26 C.P.C. 1 (C.A.); Beauvais v. The Queen, [192]
1 F.C. 171.
107. The Court's discussion limits its ruling to the terms of section 17(a). Vamam,
[1988] 2 F.C. at 461.
108. The court in Varnam concluded that the use of the term "case" in section 17(1) of
the Federal Court Act includes only federal claims for relief, not affiliated provincial law
claims. Varnam, [1988] 2 F.C. at 455. Section 101 of the BNA does not employ the term
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cations cited by the Court in interpreting the jurisdictional statute do
not apply to section 101. Because section 17(1) conferred exclusive
jurisdiction on the Federal Court, the Court was rightly concerned
with whether the intertwining approach would cause confusion among
litigants as to where they should sue upon these hybrid cases.1"' If
federal jurisdiction is not exclusive, a party in doubt may always elect
to sue in a provincial superior court. Finally, even after Varnam, the
Federal Court has the authority to adjudicate non-federal claims and
issues in certain limited contexts.110 Recognizing federal jurisdiction
over a non-federal issue is a de facto acknowledgment of at least a
limited form of ancillary jurisdiction.
The widespread use of ancillary jurisdiction makes the scope of
the constitutional federal question much greater in the United States
than it is in Canada. In addition, for purely practical reasons it means
that a federal court is more likely to become involved in lawsuits that
involve at least one claim under federal law. Because litigation is
costly, parties are much more inclined to sue in a given court if they
are assured that that court can hear all of their' related claims. If a
federal forum is unavailable, parties will tend to litigate their claims-
non-federal and federal alike-in state or provincial court. Thus, an-
cillary jurisdiction may increase the percentage of federal claims and
defenses that are actually heard in the United States federal courts.
"case"; rather, it allows federal jurisdiction "for the better administration of the laws of
Canada." CAN. CONST. (BNA), § 101.
109. Varnam, [1988] 2 F.C. at 461. Section 17(1) was amended in 1990 to make federal
jurisdiction concurrent. See infra note 114.
110. These cases can be divided into two categories. First, the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that the Federal Court may decide issues of provincial or common law that are inci-
dental to a claim arising under federal law. ITO-Int'l Terminal Operators, [1986] 1 S.C.R.
at 781-82 (per J. McIntyre). Although this decision predates Varnam, there is nothing to
indicate that the Supreme Court would change its views in light of Varnam. See also FuD.
ERAL COURT PRACricE, supra note 41, at 13-14; Laskin & Sharpe, supra note 2, at 294-95.
If the rule still stands, it means that the Federal Court may decide issues governed by non-
federal law. Cf. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (Congress meant for a federal
court to look to state law when interpreting the term "children" in the Copyright Act).
Second, in a few cases the Federal Court has recognized federal jurisdiction even over
non-federal claims. The Federal Court has indicated that it has jurisdiction to hear pro-
ceedings brought to enforce one of its judgments. Standal Estate v. Swecan Int'l Ltce, 34
C.P.R.3d 37, 40 F.T.R. 272 (1990); National Bank of Canada v. Granda, [1984] 2 F.C. 157.
raditionally, a suit brought to enforce a judgment is an action at common law. However,
these cases may be fit into the existing jurisdictional scheme if claims brought to enforce a
federal judgment comprise an additional class of federal common law.
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m. OBSERVATIONS ON THE DIFFERENT SCOPE OF
FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
The above discussion points out a number of significant differ-
ences in the scope of constitutional federal question jurisdiction in the
United States and Canada. In most respects, the jurisdiction of the
United States federal courts is more encompassing. First, the defini-
tion of federal law is broader in the United States. In addition, United
States federal courts may exercise ancillary jurisdiction over cases
presenting both federal and state law claims.
Some of these differences in the scope of jurisdiction are attribu-
table to the different language used in the United States and Canadian
constitutions. Unlike the BNA, for example, the United States Con-
stitution gives the federal courts undisputed jurisdiction over constitu-
tional claims. Based upon this clear constitutional allocation of
federal judicial authority, Americans have naturally come to view the
federal courts as the primary guardians of constitutional rights and
liberties. In Canada, by contrast, the absence of federal jurisdiction
by default thrusts the provincial courts into this role.
But the variations in wording between section 101 and Article HI
alone do not explain all of the differences. For example, it is entirely
plausible to interpret section 101 to authorize the Federal Court of
Canada to take cognizance of a case presenting both federal and pro-
vincial law claims. In addition, a literal reading of the constitutions
cannot explain why American federal courts have shown greater will-
ingness to infer a cause of action from a federal statute or regulatory
scheme. The narrower Canadian view of federal question jurisdiction
cannot be explained by the language of the BNA alone, but must be
due to certain additional factors.
Given the similarity in the overall court structure and the consti-
tutional language in the two nations, the notable differences in the
breadth of federal question jurisdiction give rise to two questions.
First, what factors have prompted the Canadian courts to take a more
restrictive view of federal question jurisdiction? Second, does the
more limited jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Canada result in less
protection for any federal interest in the outcome of a given lawsuit?
These questions can be addressed in turn.
A. Possible Reasons for the Differences in Jurisdiction
Any study of federalism is inherently imprecise. To the new-
comer, the field may appear to be overwhelmingly technical and
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fraught with narrow rules and arcane distinctions. Over time, how-
ever, it becomes apparent that any real understanding of federalism
involves a great deal more than sorting out the morass of rules. The
core issues in any study of federalism are fundamentally political. This
general principle carries over into the field of federal jurisdiction. De-
ciding that the federal courts have jurisdiction to decide a particular
issue by definition augments the power of the federal judiciary at the
expense of both the regional governments and the other branches of
the federal government. Many of the technical rules of federal juris-
diction are therefore means to a particular end, namely, an acceptable
balance of power among the various components of government in a
federal system. A complete understanding of federal jurisdiction,
therefore, requires considerable grounding in the nature of the rele-
vant political system.
First, it is necessary to understand the underlying paradigm of
federalism envisioned by the constitutional framers. That basic para-
digm will set the limits on the powers of each branch of government,
but the analysis should not stop there. It is equally important to ana-
lyze the structure employed by those framers to achieve that goal.
Over time, the original paradigm and the structure prove to be symbi-
otic. The underlying view of federalism obviously dictates the types of
institutions created to run the government. Perhaps less well under-
stood, however, is that the structure of government can over time af-
fect society's perception of the proper roles of federal and regional
governments in a federal system. Understanding the differences in
the scope of federal question jurisdiction in the Canadian and United
States systems therefore requires an analysis of the theoretical and
structural differences between the two nations.
It is impossible to catalogue all of the differences between Cana-
dian and United States federalism in a work of this scope. Neverthe-
less, certain broad themes stand out when reviewing the basic
constitutional structure and the leading cases in the Canadian and
United States jurisprudence of federal jurisdiction. These factors,
working in concert, have caused the Canadian courts to take a signifi-
cantly narrower view of the proper scope of federal question
jurisdiction.
1. The Nature of Canadian Federalism
At the outset, one should be wary about attempting to draw too
many comparisons between the Canadian and United States systems.
Even though the systems are in many ways functional equivalents, a
[Vol. 17:143
The Constitutional Federal Question
number of subtle differences exist that can significantly affect the allo-
cation of powers. Most fundamentally, there is a real difference in the
underlying concept of federalism in the two systems-a difference that
is bound to affect directly the way in which the courts interpret the
authority of the Federal Court.
Canada today certainly exhibits a less centralized form of federal-
ism than the United States, although the original intent of the respec-
tive constitutional framers may have been just the opposite."' In
many respects, the provinces have more authority in the operation of
government than do the states. This decentralization is perhaps no-
where better evidenced than in the provincial judiciaries. Parliament
has assigned very few matters exclusively to the Federal Court, choos-
ing instead to make most federal jurisdiction concurrent.112 Indeed,
there are constitutional restrictions on Parliament's ability to deprive
the provincial courts of jurisdiction over certain types of cases. 113 This
limitation reflects the general view of the constitutional framers that
the provincial courts would be the primary court system, while the
lower federal courts created under section 101 would be specialized
courts that should hear only matters of uniquely federal-as opposed
to national-concern.1 4 This underlying perception may have led the
courts to constrict the scope of federal jurisdiction in order to keep
from stripping the provincial courts of their perceived role.
2. Historical Differences
The history of lower federal courts in the United States and Can-
ada only reinforces this basic paradigm. Lower federal courts in the
United States have a rich history. Congress exercised its Article III
prerogative to establish lower federal courts during its very first term
111. In a recent article surveying the historical background of the two systems, Profes-
sor Calvin Massey argues that the framers of the Canadian system intended a more central-
ized federalism than that existing in the United States. Massey, supra note 17.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 124-28.
113. In Attorney Gen. (Canada) v. Law Socy of British Columbia, [19S2] 2 S.C.R 307,
and Canada Labour Relations Board v. Paul L'Anglais Inc., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 147, the Cana-
dian Supreme Court held that Parliament could not give the Federal Court exclusive juris-
diction to determine the constitutional validity of either federal or provincial legislation.
114. This spirit also underlies a recent amendment to the Federal Court Act that greatly
diminished the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court. An Act to Amend the Federal
Court Act, the Crown Liability Act, the Supreme Court Act, and other Acts in conse-
quence thereof, 38 Eliz. II, ch. 8 (1990). Prior to that enactment, the Federal Court had
exclusive jurisdiction over a wide variety of actions, including most significantly actions
against the federal Crown. For an interesting discussion of these amendments, see Bridge,
supra note 41.
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and has maintained and built upon the system since then."'5 More
importantly, with the exception of the original thirteen colonies, there
were federal territorial courts in each of the states prior to their incor-
poration into the Union. Thus, the United States legal system has
grown accustomed to a parallel court system.
The Canadian Federal Court is by comparison somewhat of an
interloper. The Court was not established until 1970 and became op-
erational in 1971, over one hundred years after section 101 of the
BNA authorized their creation. During that period, the provincial
courts operated largely without competition. 116 Canadians naturally
became accustomed to looking to the provincial courts for all judicial
relief, even in suits involving federal law. Expecting a new parallel
court system to supplant this longstanding tradition in a twenty-year
time span would be somewhat unrealistic, especially given the signifi-
cant statutory limitations that Parliament has placed on the Federal
Court's jurisdiction. Canadians, therefore, still view the provincial
courts as the primary court system and tend to perceive the Federal
Court as a court to be used only in certain specialized cases.
3. Statutory Differences in Jurisdiction
The statutory limitations imposed on federal jurisdiction by Con-
gress and Parliament also affect the perception of the two court sys-
tems. Congress has given the American federal courts virtually all of
the Article III federal question jurisdiction."1 7 A federal court may
hear all cases in which the plaintiff raises a federal question regardless
of the amount in controversy or the existence of affiliated state law
115. The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, established a system of district and circuit
courts for each of the original states.
116. Of course, Canada has operated a system of lower federal courts since it estab-
lished the Exchequer in 1875. However, until the establishment of the Federal Court in
1970, these courts had a very limited jurisdiction over certain specialized categories of
cases; a jurisdiction that was largely exclusive of that of the provincial courts. Thus, the
pre-1970 lower federal courts did not compete with the provincial courts. For a concise
history of lower federal courts in Canada, see F. Iacobucci, The Federal Court of Canada:
Some Comments on its Origin, Traditions and Evolution, 11 ADvoc. Q. 318 (1990).
In addition, the federal government to this day operates a court system for the territo-
ries. Although these courts are not created under section 101, see Scott, supra note 91, at
189-90, they do qualify as federal courts. However, because there are no provincial courts
in the territories, these territorial courts do not compete with provincial courts.
117. There is one notable exception to this general rule. Congress has never given the
Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of state courts involving non-
federal claims between parties of diverse citizenship, although Article III would allow it.
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claims." 8 Parliament, on the other hand, has never even come close
to granting all of the jurisdiction authorized by section 101. The Ca-
nadian Federal Court has no general federal question jurisdiction.
Rather, the Federal Court Act confines its jurisdiction to certain spe-
cific categories of cases, leaving other federal cases to be litigated in
the provincial courts.119 Because the Federal Court is unavailable for
many, if not most, federal statutory claims, Canadians have never
come to view the Federal Court as the primary guardian of federal
law.
The two systems also differ significantly in the extent to which
federal jurisdiction is exclusive. The United States federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction in a wide variety of matters, including the com-
monly-litigated areas of admiralty and maritime,"W bankruptcy, 121
patent, plant variety protection, and copyright,'m and suits against the
United States. 2' State courts accordingly have little control over
these areas of the law. By contrast, the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Canadian Federal Court is limited to actions challenging the acts of
federal agencies, 2 4 citizenship appeals,"2 and certain narrow issues
under the patent, copyright, and trademark laws. 26 Provincial courts
in Canada, therefore, have authority to adjudicate matters that are
both governed by federal law and in which there is a strong federal
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Congress has also enacted a number of jurisdictional statutes
covering specific types of cases, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 (bankruptcy), 133S (patents, trade-
marks, and copyrights), and 1343 (civil rights cases). Prior to 1980, section 1331 required
that the case involve an amount in controversy of at least S10,000.
119. Under section 25 of the Federal Court Act, the Federal Court may hear all cases
arising under federal law in which no provincial court could exercise jurisdiction. R.S.C.,
ch. F-7, § 25 (1985) (Can.). However, due to the broad scope of provincial superior court
jurisdiction, section 25 is not likely to apply in many cases.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). Although section 1346 does not explicitly make federal
jurisdiction exclusive, the United States has immunity from suit in a state court. Tarble's
Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872); M'Clung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821).
For a criticism of this rule, see Akhil R- Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE
LJ. 1425 (1987).
124. Federal Court Act, R.S.C., ch. F-7, § 18 (1985) (Can.).
125. Id. § 21.
126. Id. § 20. Unlike the United States courts-which have jurisdiction over most pat-
ent and copyright infringement actions-the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Canada is
limited to conflicting applications and proceedings brought to cancel registrations.
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interest, such as suits against the federal sovereign 2 7 and maritime
cases. 1' 8 This sharing of jurisdiction gives provincial courts significant
power in administering federal law and strengthens the perception
that federal law is not the exclusive prerogative of the courts created
by Parliament.
Other features of the Canadian federal jurisdictional statutes re-
inforce this perception. As noted above, the Federal Court's rejection
of "intertwining" jurisdiction over related provincial or common law
claims may prompt many plaintiffs to litigate their cases in provincial
courts out of considerations of efficiency. In addition, although the
criminal law in Canada is primarily federal, the adjudication of crimi-
nal matters is reserved to the provincial courts.129 This similarly sug-
gests that provincial courts are equal partners with the Federal Court
in the interpretation of federal law.
4. The Nature of the Supreme Courts
Although both Canada and the United States have a Supreme
Court, the courts differ in one important respect. The Supreme Court
of Canada is truly a "supreme" court. It may review all cases from
both the provincial courts and the Federal Court regardless of the sub-
ject matter of the dispute. This broad appellate jurisdiction allows the
Supreme Court of Canada to be equally involved in the development
of federal and non-federal law.130
Judged by the Canadian standard, the United States Supreme
Court is misnamed. The United States Supreme Court is actually only
127. Suits against the federal government were originally within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Court. As noted supra in note 114, the Federal Court Act was amended
in 1990 (Bill C-38) to make jurisdiction over such suits concurrent.
Allowing provincial courts to hear claims against the federal sovereign raises a
number of interesting questions that are unfortunately beyond the scope of this Article.
For example, one author has suggested that litigants will shop between the provincial and
Federal courts for a more favorable forum. Bridge, supra note 41, at 117. In addition, as
the liability of the federal Crown is governed by federal common law, it will be interesting
to see whether disputes will arise between the Federal and provincial courts concerning the
substantive rules of this Crown law.
128. Although the provincial courts have jurisdiction over these claims, it is unlikely
that litigants will prosecute maritime claims in the provincial courts. One advantage of
federal jurisdiction in maritime is the availability of in rem jurisdiction. Federal Court Act,
R.S.C., ch. F-7, § 22 (1985) (Can.).
129. The BNA gives Parliament exclusive authority over "[t]he Criminal Law, except
the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Crimi-
nal Matters." CAN. CONST. (BNA), § 91(27).
130. For a recent example of the Supreme Court of Canada deciding a common-law
case, see Canadian Nat'l Ry. v. Rainbow Indus. Caterers Ltd., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 3.
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a supreme federal court. Like the lower federal courts, the Supreme
Court may hear only cases falling into the nine categories of Article
HIL. Therefore, the United States Supreme Court is powerless to hear
appeals involving state law claims from the state courts, unless a party
claims that the state law is somehow inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion or a federal statute.'3 '
This difference in the nature of the Supreme Courts may indi-
rectly affect the way in which each Court interprets the constitutional
provisions governing federal jurisdiction. Because it is a federal court
of limited jurisdiction itself, the United States Supreme Court has an
incentive to interpret Article HI as broadly as possible. Any decision
narrowing the scope of Article JIl affects not only the lower federal
courts, but also serves to curtail the jurisdiction and therefore the in-
fluence of the Supreme Court. 32 The Canadian Supreme Court, on
the other hand, has no ascertainable interest in the balance of jurisdic-
tional authority between the provincial and lower federal courts. Be-
cause the Supreme Court may hear a matter regardless of whether it
fits within the section 101 definition of a federal question, 3 any limi-
tations that it places on that definition do not affect its authority.
This structural difference may also affect the general perception
of the role of -the federal judiciary in the two countries. The Supreme
Courts of both Canada and the United States are "federal" courts, for
both are created by the national legislature pursuant to an explicit
constitutional grant. However, the Supreme Court of Canada does
not look like the lower federal courts when it hears appeals from the
provincial courts. The federal Supreme Court may reverse the provin-
cial courts on any mistake of law, federal or non-federal. Thus,
Canadians do not think of the Supreme Court and the other section
101 federal courts in the same contexL
131. In theory, the Supreme Court could review such cases if the parties were of diverse
citizenship. However, none of the jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress over the
years have given the Court jurisdiction over such cases. The Supreme Court today may
hear cases from a state's highest court only where (i) the state court has ruled on a right
created by the Constitution, a treaty, or federal law, or (ii) the constitutional validity of
either state or federal law is drawn into question. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (195S).
132. Indeed, in several of its major decisions dealing with the jurisdiction of the United
States District Courts, the Supreme Court has carefully confined its holding to the jurisdic-
tional statute in question, not Article I.L Louisville & Nashville RL.L v. Mottley, 211 U.S.
149 (1908) ("face of the complaint" rule for 28 U.S.C. § 1331); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7
U.S. 267 (1806) ("complete diversity" rule for current 28 U.S.C. § 1332).
133. The BNA carefully distinguishes between Parliament's authority to create a "Gen-
eral Court of Appeal" and its ability to establish "additional Courts for the better Adminis-
tration of the Laws of Canada." CAN. CONST. (BNA), § 101.
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The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, may re-
verse state courts only on issues of federal or constitutional law. This
not only accentuates the Supreme Court's status as a federal court,
but also reinforces the notion that the main role of the federal courts
is interpreting federal law. Stated differently, the United States ap-
proach allows federal courts to disturb state court holdings only when
the state court has erroneously interpreted the constitution or federal
law. This limitation certainly accentuates the federal nature of federal
review.
B. Effects of the Differences in Jurisdiction on the Federal
Interest
The above discussion by no means exhausts all of the factors that
have caused the Canadian courts to interpret section 101 more nar-
rowly than the United States courts have interpreted Article IlI.
However, it does reflect certain basic themes set forth in the case law
and literature. For a wide variety of reasons, Canada has not chosen
to make the Federal Court the predominant authority on federal law.
Rather, it has spread that responsibility between the Federal Court
and the provincial courts, with ultimate authority in the Supreme
Court.
But at what price? Congress and Parliament both have a strong
interest in seeing their legislation enforced to the fullest extent. In the
United States, Congress has generally been able to rely upon the fed-
eral judiciary to effectuate Congressional intent. At certain critical
junctures in American history such as the period following the Civil
War the federal courts played a crucial role in this process. Parlia-
ment does not always have a federal forum available to try cases in-
volving federal law. Accordingly, the Canadian approach may fail to
protect the federal interest in federal legislation.
That conclusion, however, is built upon the assumption that fed-
eral courts are somehow better able to protect the federal interest
than regional courts. That assumption may indeed be true in the
United States. If the United States were to abolish the lower federal
courts, there would in all likelihood be a significant impact on the in-
fluence of federal legislation. Although state judges are generally
quite competent and impartial, they are subject to several pressures
that do not affect federal judges. Foremost among these is the electo-
ral process. State judges are often elected to office, and typically
serve limited terms. These localized pressures may make a state judge
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less willing to enforce controversial federal legislation.13 On the
other hand, because the federal judiciary is relatively immune from
influence from both the electoral process and state governments, it
has been able to carry out a number of controversial federal statutes,
such as the environmental, antitrust, and civil rights laws.
Canada certainly gives the provincial courts considerably more
authority in the enforcement of federal law than the United States
gives the states. However, the efficacy of federal law has probably not
suffered. Just as there are structural factors explaining the diminished
importance of the Federal Court of Canada, there are other factors
that minimize the likelihood of any bias against the federal interest.
First, the judges of the provincial superior courts are not elected,
but appointed by the national government.'3 They may serve until
age 75, unless removed for improper behavior.136 These rules imme-
diately remove perhaps the most potent local influence on those
judges, namely, the regional electoral process. If anything, provincial
superior court judges are more likely to reflect the national interest
than the parochial interest of their province.
Second, the nature of the Supreme Court of Canada, while per-
haps diminishing the authority of the Federal Court, also serves to
protect the national interest. Because it is a general court of appeal,
the Supreme Court may review all cases in the provincial courts. Un-
like the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada
may review any provincial court interpretation of local or common
law that impairs the federal interest in any matter. Also, because the
Supreme Court is relatively immune from local pressures, it has every
incentive to preserve that federal interest.
Overall, then, the Canadian and American judicial systems would
appear to protect the federal interest in federal law to approximately
the same degree. The United States has relied primarily upon the fed-
eral courts for this purpose. Yet, this certainly is not the only way to
protect the federal interest. Canada has been able to protect the fed-
eral interest without expanding the authority of its Federal Court.
Certain subtle structural differences between the systems-primarily
the greater independence of the provincial and Supreme courts from
134. As noted supra in note 7, this trend has probably reversed over the last few years
as Republican Presidents have stacked the federal judiciary with conservative judges.
Over most of this century, however, the federal judiciary has proven more willing to en-
force national programs.
135. CAN. CONST. (BNA), § 96.
136. Id. § 99.
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local influence-have enabled Parliament to use the existing provin-
cial judiciaries to enforce federal statutes.
The Federal Court of Canada serves a more limited function in its
system. Because Parliament has other tools at its disposal to protect
the federal interest, it operates the Federal Court primarily to ensure
some degree of uniformity in the interpretation and application of
federal law.137 Although Parliament has significantly undermined this
role in recent years,'38 the Federal Court is still the main judicial tribu-
nal in certain specialized areas of the law such as maritime, citizen-
ship, and the review of federal agency action. This more limited role
suggests that the success of the Federal Court of Canada should be
measured not by the extent to which it protects Parliament's interests,
but to the degree that its decisions foster uniformity in these uniquely
federal areas of Canadian law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The British Columbia proposal to abolish the Federal Court of
Canada may appear strange to observers accustomed to the United
States paradigm of federal and state courts. Viewed from the Cana-
dian perspective, however, the proposal is much less controversial.
Unlike the lower federal courts in the United States, the Federal
Court of Canada does not play an indispensable role in the adminis-
tration of Canadian federalism. Instead, Canadians have long been
accustomed to resorting to the provincial courts to enforce federal
statutes. Abolishing the Federal Court may even serve to remove a
needless redundancy in the Canadian system.
Furthermore, removing that redundancy would not impair the au-
thority of the federal government. The Canadian federal government
has a significantly greater ability to control the actions of provincial
courts than the United States federal government has over the state
courts. Although operating an independent federal court system may
provide some intangible boost to federal authority, Parliament cer-
tainly has other ways to assert and protect its position in the scheme of
Canadian federalism. It is, therefore, fitting that the final decision
137. Professor John Evans suggests that this is the main function of the Federal Court.
John Evans, Comment: Federal Jurisdiction-A Lamentable Situation, 59 CAN. B. REv. 124,
142 n.55 (1981). This also helps to explain certain structural characteristics of the Federal
Court, for example, why the Court is a unitary court with trial and appellate divisions
instead of a system of multiple regional courts as in the United States.
138. As discussed supra in note 114, Parliament removed much of the Federal Court's
exclusive jurisdiction in 1990.
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concerning whether to keep the Federal Court will eventually be
made in the complex Canadian political system, for the factors that
should guide the decision are essentially political, not legal.

